This article analyzes the new rule constraining rent updating, after commenting on the effects and history of rent control, to analyze the involution that has occurred in Spanish laws since the 1985 rent liberalization. It criticizes that, since 1994, the law imposes on the parties a minimum contract duration; and two of the proposals contained in the Bill currently under discussion, related to the administrative setting of maximum rents and the discriminatory treatment of larger and more professional landlords.
The article asks what forces lead Spanish society to repeat the error when it comes to regulating residential rentals. It explores the possibility that, contrary to usual arguments, which assume that the regulation protects relatively weak and homogeneous tenants, this supposed error actually favors a certain type of tenant. Specifically, it would favor those, such as permanent employees of large companies and public officials, who, due to their stability and easy location, offer better guarantees to the lessor.